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MONETARY AWARDS TO THE DEBTOR FOR
VIOLATIONS OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
JEFFREY A. STOOPS
I. INTRODUCTION
Upon the filing of either a voluntary or involuntary petition for
relief under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,1 the debtor2 re-
ceives protection in the form of a statutory automatic stay from
virtually all actions that a creditors might take against him or his
property." The stay goes into effect automatically upon filing with-
out a court order and protects the individual or corporate debtor
seeking liquidation or reorganization.' In addition to protecting
property of the estateJ the stay protects against creditor enforce-
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) [hereinafter cited as the Bankruptcy Reform
Act]. The new law contains four titles, which are codified under several titles of the United
States Code. Title I of the Bankruptcy Reform Act contains the substantive bankruptcy
provisions and is codified as 11 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981). Title II of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act deals primarily with the creation and jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts and is codi-
fied under various sections of 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981). Title III of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act amends several sections of the United States Code and is codified under various titles
other than Titles 11 and 28. Title IV of the Bankruptcy Reform Act specifically repeals the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and subsequent amendments (former 11 U.S.C.), and establishes
transitional procedures by which the new law is to be implemented. Where applicable, fur-
ther references in text and notes to provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act will be cited
to the United States Code, except that Title I in its entirety will be referred to as the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
2. The term "debtor" as used in this comment includes the individual debtor seeking
liquidation and discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766, the trustee as guardian of the prop-
erty of the estate created by 11 U.S.C. § 541, and the debtor-in-possession seeking either
reorganization under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 or debt adjustment under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1330, unless the context in which the term "debtor" is used indicates otherwise.
3. The term "creditor" as used in this comment includes any entity to which the
prohibitions of the automatic stay apply, and not just those parties to whom the debtor is
indebted.
4. The automatic stay is codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. V 1981). For comprehensive
analyses of the protections afforded to the debtor by the automatic stay, see 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRupTcY 11 362.01-.11 (L. King 15th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]; Kennedy,
Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 3 (1978).
5. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 4, 1 362.03, at 362-26.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 362 is made applicable to all claims for relief under the Bankruptcy Code
by 11 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. V 1981). See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 174 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 5963, 6135; 2 COLLIER, supra note 4,
362.01, at 362-5.
7. Property of the estate is all property in which the debtor has legal or equitable inter-
ests at the time of filing the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. V 1981). All property of the
estate, however, does not necessarily go toward the eventual satisfaction of creditors' claims.
See 2 COLLIER, supra note 4, 1 362.04(5), at 362-34. The property eventually used to satisfy
creditors' claims is protected specifically by the stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2)-(4) (Supp.
V 1981).
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ment of pre-petition claims in the form of in personam actions
against the debtor8 and actions against exempt property which has
been retaken by the debtor in his individual capacity. 9 The stay
remains in effect until the property is no longer property of the
estate or, in the context of actions taken against the debtor person-
ally or against property exempted from the estate, until the debtor
receives his discharge or confirmation of the reorganization plan.'0
Clearly,
[t]he automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protec-
tions provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a
breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all
harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to
attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be re-
lieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy."
However, as all-encompassing and protective as the automatic stay
may be, its practical effect depends on creditor compliance. Credi-
tors can, and often do, violate the automatic stay and impose ex-
actly the type of hardships upon the debtor which the stay was
designed to prevent. In response to these violations, bankruptcy
courts have fashioned various forms of relief to the victimized
debtor and, in particular, have adopted a fairly uniform approach
specifically to redress losses incurred by the debtor.
This comment will focus on monetary awards to the debtor for a
creditor's physical acts against the debtor or his property in viola-
tion of the automatic stay." The emphasis will be on the bank-
8. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (2), (6)-(8) (Supp. V 1981). See, e.g., In re Holland, 21 Bankr.
681, 687 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1982).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5)-(7) (Supp. V 1981). See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 340-
42.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (Supp. V 1981). See generally 5 COLLIER, supra note 4, 1129.01-
.05, 1141.01 (debtor seeking reorganization receives a discharge at the time the plan for
reorganization is confirmed); id. 1 1328.01[1]-[5] (debtor seeking adjustment of debts re-
ceives a discharge after completion of all payments under-a repayment plan).
11. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 340.
12. In this context, the term "physical act" refers to any act by which a creditor affects
the debtor's enjoyment of his person or property, such as repossession, garnishment, evic-
tion or attempted collection. Violations of the stay that fall short of this point usually do
not result in losses to the debtor. If a creditor pursues a judicial action against the debtor in
disregard of the automatic stay, the bankruptcy court can enjoin the creditor from proceed-
ing on the claim in the nonbankruptcy forum. See, e.g., Taylor v. Widdowson (In re Taylor),
16 Bankr. 323 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981) (bankruptcy court enjoined criminal proceedings
founded upon debtor's nonpayment of wages). In cases in which the creditor's judicial ac-
tions have proceeded to final form in violation of the stay, such as the creditor obtaining a
money judgment against the debtor, the usual approach taken by the bankruptcy court is to
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ruptcy courts' current approach toward relieving the debtor, but
will also include an analysis of the inadequacies of the approach
and the potential benefits of an alternate approach."3
II. THE BASIS FOR DEBTOR RELIEF FROM VIOLATIONS OF THE
AUTOMATIC STAY
A. Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court
Whether the bankruptcy courts have concurrent or exclusive ju-
risdiction over a debtor's claim involving a violation of the auto-
matic stay is a question dependent upon the nature of the credi-
tor's acts. There is an important distinction between acts
prohibited only by the automatic stay and acts prohibited under
state law as well." A creditor who, for example, peacefully repos-
declare the judgment void and without effect. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
13. This comment will proceed on the assumption that Congress will adopt proposed
legislation which will elevate bankruptcy judges to Article III status and allow them to con-
tinue to exercise all of the jurisdiction and authority exercised by bankruptcy judges prior
to the Supreme Court decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). See H.R. 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); 41
CONG. Q. WEuKLY REPs. 215, 336, 384 (1983).
In brief, Northern Pipeline held that Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2671
(1978), unconstitutionally granted jurisdiction to a non-Article III court. 102 S. Ct. at 2879-
80. Rather than attempt to eliminate only those provisions of § 241(a) which were unconsti-
tutional, the Court chose to invalidate the entire section and allow Congress to restructure it
in a manner which would pass constitutional muster. Id. at 2880 n.40. Section 241(a) had
implemented almost the full range of the bankruptcy court's authority and was codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1482 (Supp. V 1981). While all of these sections codified under Title 28
may not prove to be unconstitutional grants of authority to a non-Article III court, see infra
note 60, the effect of the Northern Pipeline decision is to force Congress to reevaluate §
241(a) in its entirety. For a more extensive discussion of the effects of the Northern Pipe-
line decision and the options available to Congress, see VanDercreek, Article III versus
Bankruptcy Judges and Magistrates-A Partial Triumph of Principles of Separation of
Powers Over the Pragmatism of Docket Congestion, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. Rev. 569 (1983);
Vihon, Analysis of the Northern Pipeline Case, 87 Com. L.J. 397 (1982).
There remains the possibility that Congress may decide to conclusively establish the
bankruptcy courts as non-Article III adjuncts to the district courts. See S. 792, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S2717-19 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1983). In the event this occurs, the
bankruptcy courts may lose some of the powers that have enabled them to provide relief to
the debtor for violations of the automatic stay. See infra note 60. The debtor will then have
to seek redress in the district courts and the substantive aspects of debtor relief as ad-
dressed in this comment will shift in applicability to claims brought before the district
courts.
14. This distinction was previously missed by one bankruptcy court. See, e.g., Spring-
field Bank v. Caserta (In re Caserta), 10 Bankr. 57 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (creditor's oth-
erwise valid repossession of debtor's automobile in violation of the automatic stay was con-
sidered a trespass to personal property). Any continued adherence to this approach is
doubtful, however, in light of a recent decision from the same court. Thacker v. Etter (In re
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sesses an automobile parked in a public area from a defaulting
debtor generally has not committed an act which would entitle the
debtor to relief under state law.' 5 However, at the moment the
bankruptcy petition is filed, the same act of repossession becomes
prohibited by, and only by, the automatic stay.' Contrast this
with creditor actions which, in addition to being violations of the
automatic stay, are actionable under state law, such as trespass or
damage to property. 17 In cases such as this, the debtor can bring an
action based on the common-law claim in either state court or
bankruptcy court, which has original and concurrent jurisdiction
over civil proceedings "arising under [the Bankruptcy Code] or
arising in or related to cases under [the Bankruptcy Code]."' 8 If
this claim is brought in bankruptcy court, the court is bound to
apply the substantive laws of the state where the creditor's act oc-
curred and must fashion relief accordingly.' 9
In comparison, claims for relief from creditor's acts prohibited
solely by the automatic stay should be brought only in bankruptcy
court. While, in theory, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over these claims as "proceedings arising under" the Bankruptcy
Thacker), 24 Bankr. 835 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
15. See, e.g., Raffa v. Dania Bank, 321 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); FLA. STAT. §
679.503 (1981).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) would stay repossession if the automobile was property of the
estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) would stay repossession if the automobile was exempt property
of the debtor and the creditor's claim was unsecured prior to filing the petition. See gener-
ally 2 COLLIER, supra note 4, 362.04[3], at 362-31; id. 1 362.04[5], at 362-34.
17. E.g., Pal Transp., Inc. v. All Fla. Recovery Agency (In re Pal Transp., Inc.), 13
Bankr. 935 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (debtor brought common-law trespass action for credi-
tor's acts which occurred during automatic stay period); Thornton v. Winters Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. (In re Thornton), 14 Bankr. 84 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (claim for damages to
debtor's automobile while in creditor's possession in violation of the stay).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. V 1981). See Thornton, 14 Bankr. at 86. Section 1471(b)
specifically grants this jurisdiction to the district courts; however, the bankruptcy courts are
authorized to exercise this jurisdiction by 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (Supp. V 1981). For an analy-
sis of this expansive grant of jurisdiction, see 1 COLLIER, supra note 4, 3.01[l][d], [e], at 3-
36 to -49.
The Northern Pipeline decision has ruled that this exercise of jurisdiction is unconstitu-
tional for a non-Article III court. 102 S. Ct. at 2879-80. Therefore, the continued ability of
the bankruptcy courts to exercise this concurrent jurisdiction over claims grounded in state
law depends on Congress elevating the bankruptcy judges to Article III status. See supra
note 13.
19. E.g., Pal Transp., Inc., 13 Bankr. at 941-42 (debtor denied recovery for alleged tres-
pass and conversion since, although in violation of automatic stay, acts were not actionable
under Florida law); accord, Fahringer v. Bohne (In re Victor Distrib. Co.), 11 Bankr. 242
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981) (bankruptcy court applied state law to determine both substance
and proper relief for a claim alleging mental anguish).
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Code, 0 there are other factors which severely, if not completely,
limit the ability of the state court to grant relief. A great limitation
is the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court "of all
of the property, whereever located, of the debtor, as of the com-
mencement of [the bankruptcy] case."21 Thus, state courts no
longer have jurisdiction over traditionally in rem actions concern-
ing the property of the debtor. 2 In addition, there are decisions
that imply that any action affecting the relationship between a
creditor and debtor in bankruptcy is outside the proper scope of
state court review.23 In any event, state courts seem unsure of their
ability to deal with cases so closely related to a pending bank-
ruptcy case2" and would most likely abstain and refer the matter to
the bankruptcy court.2 5 Such abstention would be the proper ap-
proach in light of the expressed desire of Congress that these
claims be addressed in bankruptcy court.26 Therefore, all further
20. See 1 COLLIER, supra note 4, 3.01[1][d][ii], at 3-39 to -44. A claim seeking relief for
a creditor's violation of the automatic stay would be considered a controversy involving an
adverse party arising out of the debtor's bankruptcy case and within the original, but not
exclusive, jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. See H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2-201(a),
(b) (1975), reprinted in 1 COLLIER, supra note 4, 3.01, at 3-42 to -43; S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 153, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5939.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (Supp. V 1981). See generally 1 COLLIER, supra note 4,
3.0111][g], at 3-54 to -56.
22. See, e.g., Parenteau v. Bellucci (In re Bellucci), 9 Bankr. 887, 889 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1981) (action seeking to determine trustee's interest in property subject to creditor's attach-
ment was within exclusive jurisdiction of bankruptcy court).
23. See Northern Pipeline, 102 S. Ct. at 2871 (restructuring debtor-creditor relations is
a matter for the bankruptcy courts while debtor is in bankruptcy); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308
U.S. 433, 438-40 (1940) (proceedings involving the bankrupt debtor are outside state court's
jurisdiction).
24. Compare Miller v. R.K.A. Management Corp., 160 Cal. Rptr. 164, 168 (Ct. App.
1979) (court was without jurisdiction over property of debtor during pendency of automatic
stay) with Lanesboro State Bank v. Hennessey, 317 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Minn. 1982) (court had
jurisdiction over parties, but was stayed from determining any rights of the parties involving
property possibly recoverable by the trustee) and Community Investors IX, Ltd. v. Phillips
Plastering Co., 593 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (court without jurisdiction over
debtor or property while automatic stay is operative).
25. See Miller, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 168; cf. Fleming v. Busey, 265 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. Ct. App.
1980). In Fleming, the debtor's wife sought a protective order in state court from discovery
by a creditor seeking execution against the debtor during his pending bankruptcy case. The
court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the protective order and held that the
issue should be addressed in bankruptcy court. Fleming, 265 S.E.2d at 840.
26. S. RaP. No. 989, supra note 20, at 18. Cf. Barber-Greene Co. v. Zeco Co., 17 Bankr.
248, 249 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) (bankruptcy court has responsibility to determine effects of
its own stay).
Even if Congress chooses to establish bankruptcy courts as non-Article III courts, it ap-
pears that they will continue to hear claims involving violations of the automatic stay.
Under the proposed Senate bill S. 792, supra note 13, bankruptcy courts shall exercise juris-
1983]
428 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:423
discussion concerning debtor relief will be in the context of claims
brought in bankruptcy court.
B. Remedial Powers of the Bankruptcy Court
The automatic stay does not, by its own terms, provide any sanc-
tions for violation, nor are any explicitly provided elsewhere under
the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Any remedy that the bankruptcy
courts provide is thus equitable in nature.' The authority by
which the bankruptcy court awards this relief is a composite of va-
rious United States Code provisions implemented under the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act. The basic grant of power is codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1481, which provides that "[a] bankruptcy court shall
have the powers of a court of equity, law and admiralty, but may
not enjoin another court or punish a criminal contempt not com-
mitted in the presence of the judge of the court or warranting a
punishment of imprisonment."' s8 As intended by Congress, this sec-
tion "is the concomitant of the bankruptcy courts [sic] increased
jurisdiction [under 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b)], and is necessary to enable
the bankruptcy court to exercise that jurisdiction and its powers
under the bankruptcy code."' 9
A second section, codified at 11 U.S.C. § 105, provides the bank-
ruptcy courts with basically all powers necessary to implement the
substantive provisions of the bankruptcy laws. 0 Section 105(a)
provides simply that "[t]he bankruptcy court may issue any order,
process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]." 81 In addition, the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act amended 28 U.S.C. § 451"2 in order to bring the
diction conferred to them by the district courts, which would include "a proceeding which is
based on a claim under a provision of (the Bankruptcy Code] and which could not have
been brought by any person in the absence of the commencement of a case under [the
Bankruptcy Code]," although such a proceeding may be subject to recall by the district
court. Id.; 129 CONG. Rzc. at 82718.
27. See 1 COLLMR, supra note 4, 1 3.01[5][b][ii].
28. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2671 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1481
(Supp. V 1981)). Depending on how Congress responds to the Northern Pipeline decision,
the bankruptcy courts may lose their contempt power. See infra note 60.
29. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 448.
30. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 105, 92 Stat. 2549, 2555 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 105
(Supp. V 1981)).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (Supp. V 1981). Section 105 is the basis for the bankruptcy court's
broad use of injunctive power, which has been used to enjoin actions directed against the
debtor or his property in violation of the stay. See, e.g., Taylor, 16 Bankr. at 325.
32. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 213, 92 Stat. 2549, 2661 (1978) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 451
(Supp. V 1981)).
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bankruptcy courts within the scope of the All Writs Statute.33 The
All Writs Statute merely equates the power of the bankruptcy
court with that of other courts created by Congress and does not
provide any substantive power in addition to that provided by 11
U.S.C. § 105.' 4 Thus, except for the prohibitions on enjoining an-
other court and punishing certain criminal contempts, the bank-
ruptcy courts have the full range of powers provided to other fed-
eral courts.
In exercising this broad grant of power when confronted with a
creditor's actions taken in violation of the automatic stay, the
bankruptcy courts have adopted a fairly consistent approach to
providing relief to the aggrieved debtor. As a general rule, an ac-
tion taken in violation of the stay is held to be void and without
effect.3 5 This rule stems from a decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in which a state court judgment rendered in violation
of the stay was held to be a nullity." The basis for the decision was
that, during a pending bankruptcy case, a state court was without
jurisdiction to adjudicate any pecuniary matters involving the
debtor or his property.87 Over the years, the rule has been ex-
tended to extrajudicial actions as well.38 The logic connecting a
creditor's extrajudicial actions to a rule premised on a state court's
lack of jurisdiction is strained at best. Nevertheless, the rule re-
mains the bankruptcy court's preferred approach toward judicial
as well as extrajudicial actions taken in violation of the stay.
III. MONETARY RELIEF FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
While a declaration voiding the creditor's act may provide all the
relief necessary from a creditor's final money judgment obtained in
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). See generally 2 COLLIR, supra note 4, 1 105.01, at 105-2.
34. The All Writs Statute provides that:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agree-
able to the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court
which has jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976).
35. See, e.g., In re Eisenberg, 7 Bankr. 683, 686 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (coerced pay-
ment of tax lien in violation of the stay held void).
36. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
37. Id. at 438-40.
38. E.g., Nelson v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Nelson), 6 Bankr. 248, 251
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (setoff of debtor's account held void); Miller v. Savings Bank of Bal-
timore (In re Miller), 10 Bankr. 778, 780 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981), afl'd, 22 Bankr. 479 (D. Md.
1982) (repossession of debtor's automobile held void).
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violation of the stay, the same declaration provides little relief to
the debtor whose car has been repossessed.3 9 In those cases in
which the creditor has physically acted against the debtor or his
property, some affirmative action by the bankruptcy court is re-
quired to aid the debtor. At a minimum, this action usually takes
the form of an order directing the creditor to stop harrassing the
debtor and to return any property taken in violation of the stay. '0
This approach reflects a restitutionary form of relief, as opposed to
an approach in which the debtor is compensated for his losses.41
The difference between the two is that the latter is designed to
remedy the debtor's losses with relief similar to a damages award,
while restitution is aimed at preventing unjust enrichment for the
creditor.42 Thus, the relief granted the debtor is measured more by
the amount the creditor benefitted by acting in contravention of
the stay than by the actual loss sustained by the debtor. For exam-
ple, a creditor who had garnished the debtor's account in violation
of the stay would be ordered to return the amount wrongfully gar-
nished, and that would be the extent of the debtor's recovery.43 A
car wrongfully repossessed in violation of the stay would be or-
dered returned to the debtor, but he would not recover losses
caused by the absence of the car. 4
The remedial approach shifts to one of compensation, however,
at a point apparently dependent on the character of the creditor's
conduct. Recovery is no longer limited to an amount equal to the
creditor's gains. The debtor is now able to receive compensation
for various forms of loss. In the vast majority of decisions imple-
menting this approach, the creditor is held in contempt of court
for violation of the automatic stay and is ordered to compensate
the debtor for his losses. In fact, some decisions have implied that
the only time a debtor can be awarded full compensation is pursu-
39. See In re Reed, 11 Bankr. 258, 272-73 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
40. E.g., Nelson, 6 Bankr. at 251 (funds wrongfully set off by bank restored to debtor);
Miller, 10 Bankr. at 780 (creditor ordered to return repossessed automobile); In re Ware, 9
Bankr. 24 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (college ordered to release transcript withheld in viola-
tion of stay).
41. See generally D. DoBBs, REMEDIES § 1.1, at 1-2 (1973).
42. Id. § 4.1, at 224.
43. E.g., Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 14 Bankr. 405,
408 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981) (bank wrongfully set off funds from debtor's account; debtor
reimbursed by amount equal to excess setoff, but no compensatory or punitive damages).
44. Cf. In re Johnson, 18 Bankr. 755, 757 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (creditor held in con-
tempt and ordered to compensate debtor; however, no contempt would have been found nor
would compensation have been awarded to the debtor had the creditor returned the wrong-
fully repossessed automobile upon acquiring notice of the stay).
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ant to a contempt proceeding.4 Regardless of the accuracy of this
view,4 the initiation of a contempt proceeding against the creditor
should be the debtor's first choice when seeking compensatory re-
lief. The remaining portion of this comment will address the sub-
stance and procedure of contempt proceedings used to compensate
the debtor, the availability of compensation under alternate theo-
ries of recovery, and the inherent problems of contempt proceed-
ings as the sole route for the debtor's recovery.
A. Compensatory Awards to the Debtor Pursuant to a
Contempt Order
The contempt order imposed on the creditor by the bankruptcy
court to compensate the debtor is one of civil as opposed to crimi-
nal contempt.'7 The power of the bankruptcy court to impose
criminal contempt orders is severely limited 48 and, in any event, a
fine levied on the creditor for a criminal contempt would be paid
to the court and not to the debtor.'9 The distinction between civil
and criminal contempt is a subtle and often difficult one for courts
to make.50 The practical difference between the two classes con-
cerns both procedure and punishment. In a criminal contempt, the
contemnor is entitled to the safeguards of criminal procedure and
the punishment may include imprisonment, while a civil contempt
is procedurally similar to a civil trial and the contemnor is subject
only to monetary sanctions. 51 The two differ in theory as well, as a
criminal contempt is used to vindicate the authority of the court
while a civil contempt is for the benefit of the party wronged by
45. See, e.g., Stacy v. Roanoke Memorial Hosps. (In re Stacy), 21 Bankr. 49 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1982).
46. See infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Thacker, 24 Bankr. at 838 n.1.
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. V 1981); 1 COLLIER, supra note 4, 3.01[5][b][v], at 3-
109 to -110.
49. See D. DOBBS, supra note 41, § 2.9, at 99-100.
50. See, e.g., Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904):
It may not be always easy to classify a particular act as belonging to either one
of these two classes. It may partake of the characteristics of both. A significant
and generally determinative feature is that the act is by one party to a suit in
disobedience of a special order made in behalf of the other. Yet sometimes the
disobedience may be of such a character and in such a manner as to indicate a
contempt of the court rather than a disregard of the rights of the adverse party.
Id. at 329. See generally Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Be-
tween Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. CINN. L. REv. 677, 681-84 (1981).
51. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 41, § 2.9, at 96-100.
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the contemnor's acts.5 2
Civil contempts are divided into two types: coercive and com-
pensatory." Coercive civil contempt induces the contemnor to stop
the prohibited act by imposition of a fine, payment of which goes
to the court.5 4 Compensatory civil contempt, on the other hand,
reimburses the injured party for losses caused by the contemnor's
acts. Compensatory civil contempt awards are thus analogous to
money damages awarded pursuant to a tort judgment obtained by
the debtor against the creditor.5" For civil contempts imposed for
violations of the automatic stay, the punishment is generally a
compensatory award to the debtor since the creditor's acts are usu-
ally limited to a single violation and there is no need for a coercive
fine. 7 Compensatory contempts outside of bankruptcy are most
often utilized against persons who have violated judicial injunc-
tioris.5' This compares favorably with the use of compensatory civil
contempts to remedy violations of the automatic stay, which is es-
sentially a statutory injunction prohibiting certain acts against the
debtor or his property."
1. Authority for the Use of Contempt Power to Compensate
the Debtor
The substantive grant of the bankruptcy courts' contempt power
stems from 28 U.S.C. § 1481, which provides the authority to pun-
ish any civil contempts and those criminal contempts committed in
the presence of the judge."e A bankruptcy judge is limited in that
52. E.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). See generally 1
COLLIER, supra note 4, 3.01[5][v], at 3-106 to -107.
53. See, e.g., McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949); Hill v. Farm-
ers Home Admin. (In re Hill), 19 Bankr. 375, 379 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
54. See Randleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiff's Remedy When A Defendant
Violates An Injunction, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 971, 972; but cf. D. DOERS, supra note 41, § 2.9, at
99 (all fines imposed for civil contempt go to opposing party).
55. See Rendleman, supra note 54, at 972.
56. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946).
57. But cf. In re Demp, 23 Bankr. 239, 240 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (debtor could not
prove damages and thus received no compensatory award, but creditor was fined $50 and
charged $200 in counsel fees).
58. See Rendleman, supra note 54, at 972.
59. See Thacker, 24 Bankr. at 838.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. V 1981). See supra text accompanying note 28. If the bank-
ruptcy courts are not elevated to Article III status, there is some dispute as to whether they
will retain their contempt power. One district court has ruled that bankruptcy courts have
no contempt power as non-Article III courts, Lindsey v. Cryta (In re Cox Cotton Co.), 24
Bankr. 930, 945-56 (E.D. Ark. 1982), while other district courts have reafirmed the bank-
ruptcy courts' contempt power through the promulgation of emergency rules implemented
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he cannot impose imprisonment for a criminal contempt,' but
there are no limitations on the dollar amount of fines imposed for
either civil or criminal contempt.6e This substantive grant is made
operative by 11 U.S.C. § 105, which authorizes the bankruptcy
court to issue any judgment "necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this title."" The infractions which may be subject
to a contempt citation are not specified under the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act as they were under the prior bankruptcy laws." With the
amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 451 to include bankruptcy courts as
United States courts 5 it appears that the bankruptcy courts will
be limited to the same extent as other federal courts in those acts
which may be punishable by contempt citation. The determinative
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 401, provides that:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine
or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority,
in response to the Northern Pipeline decision. See, e.g., Moody v. Martin, 27 Bankr. 991,
1002 (W.D. Wis. 1983); see also Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Doan (In re Johns-Manville
Corp.), 26 Bankr. 919, 923-24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (expressively rejecting the Cox Cotton
decision). The Supreme Court has implicitly upheld the bankruptcy courts' § 1481 contempt
power by referring to the section in the prescribed bankruptcy rules. See Bankruptcy Rules,
infra note 67, Rule 9020.
The legislation currently before Congress which would establish the bankruptcy courts as
non-Article III adjuncts to the district courts would also limit the powers of a bankruptcy
judge to those of a United States magistrate. See S. 792, supra note 13; 129 CONG. Rac. at
S2718. A United States magistrate does not have contempt power, but must certify the facts
of the contemptuous conduct to the district court for treatment under the district court's
contempt power. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) (Supp. V 1981). This result to some extent would resem-
ble the bankruptcy judge's contempt powers prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act. The
bankruptcy judge was limited to imposing a $250 fine and any conduct warranting greater
punishment had to be certified to the district court. See infra notes 103-10 and accompany-
ing text.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. V 1981).
62. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 4, 105.03, at 105-7. See infra note 110.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. V 1981). See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
64. The bankruptcy laws in existence prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
originated primarily from the Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976)), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, J
401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978).
The prior Act specified the types of acts that were punishable by contempt. The applica-
ble section provided that:
A person shall not, in (bankruptcy proceedings], (1) disobey or resist any lawful
order, process, or writ; (2) misbehave during a hearing or so near the place thereof
as to obstruct the same; (3) neglect to produce, after having been ordered to do so,
any pertinent document; or (4) refuse to appear after having been subpenaed [sic]
or, upon appearing, refuse to take the oath as a witness, or having taken the oath,
refuse to be examined according to law.
11 U.S.C. § 69(a) (1976).
65. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official
transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command."
While the Bankruptcy Reform Act defined the substantive as-
pects of the bankruptcy courts' contempt power, it was silent as to
procedure. The United States Supreme Court has recently pre-
scribed bankruptcy rules which, if accepted by Congress as ex-
pected, will supersede all existing rules as of August 1, 1983.7 Rule
9014 will govern civil contempt proceedings for violations of the
automatic stay." The rule provides that the debtor may request a
contempt order by written motion; the creditor would then be af-
forded reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing." The
creditor need not respond to the motion unless the court orders
otherwise.70 The hearing is not conducted as an adversary proceed-
ing, although the court may, at its option, conduct the hearing as
such 1 The Federal Rules of Evidence are applicable to the hear-
ing. 72 Rule 9015, governing jury trials before the bankruptcy court,
does not alter the existing rights of the parties to a jury trial.7 3 It is
expected that the bankruptcy courts will continue to follow other
federal courts and conduct contempt proceedings without a jury,7 '
although the new rules allow the bankruptcy court to hear what
would normally be non-jury issues with the aid of an advisory
jury.75 Finally, a civil contempt order imposed on a creditor for
66. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
67. See Order, 51 U.S.L.W. 4461 (U.S. April 25, 1983) (hereinafter cited as the Bank-
ruptcy Rules). Since the new rules have not yet been accepted by Congress, the existing
rules will be referred to as the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure [hereinafter cited as
FED. R. BANKR. P.].
68. Bankruptcy Rules, supra note 67, Rule 9014. Rule 9014 will govern a contempt pro-
ceeding as "a contested matter in a case under the (Bankruptcy] Code not otherwise gov-
erned by these rules." Id.
69. Id. Rules 9013, 9014. Civil contempts are initiated by motion and not by a complaint
because the proceedings are not independent of the debtor's pending bankruptcy case. See 1
COLLIER, supra note 4, 3.01[5][b] [v], at 3-105.
70. Bankruptcy Rules, supra note 67, Rule 9014.
71. Id.
72. Id. Rule 9017.
73. Id. Rule 9015.
74. See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 298 (1947).
75. Bankruptcy Rules, supra note 67, Rule 9015.
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violation of the automatic stay is appealable even though it is in-
terlocutory. 76 The new rules specify the procedure for taking an
interlocutory appeal. 77 As a general rule, the grant or denial of a
contempt order will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of
discretion. 78
2. History of the Use of Contempt Power to Compensate the
Debtor
The bankruptcy courts' current use of the contempt power to
compensate the debtor basically evolved in two stages, with each
stage being significantly innovative. While the two stages combined
have resulted in an expanded use of the contempt power to the
benefit of the aggrieved debtor, the logic and legal propriety be-
hind each "breakthrough" have not gone without criticism.
The single case representative of the first stage is the Second
Circuit decision, Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders,
Inc.7 e While not the first decision finding a contempt for violation
of a stay provision, 80 nor the first in which monies were awarded
directly to the debtor,81 Fidelity Mortgage is significant for both
the amount awarded and the underlying logic on which the award
was upheld.
Defendants had instituted an action in federal district court sit-
ting in another state seeking a ruling ensuring superiority over a
competing lien of the plaintiff/debtor.8 2 This act was in violation of
76. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 1482(b) (Supp. V 1981). Since the order is interlocutory, how-
ever, there is no right to appeal. The challenging party must seek and be granted leave to
take an appeal from the district court or an appellate panel. See generally 1 COLLIER, supra
note 4, 3.03[7][d].
77. Bankruptcy Rules, supra note 67, Rules 8001-8003.
78. E.g., V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 226 (10th Cir. 1979); In re Mullen, 14
Bankr. 39, 40 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
79. 550 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977).
80. See, e.g., In re Young, 1 COLLIER BANKE. CAS. (MB) 145, 146 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1974)
(creditor held in contempt for violation of stay, ordered to pay $200 fine to court); Moore v.
United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon (In re Tallyn), 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 487, 489
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1975) (creditor held in contempt for violation of stay; ordered to pay $100
fine to court).
81. See, e.g., In re Tillery, 2 BANKU. CT. DEc. (CRR) 798, 799 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1976)
(creditor held in contempt for wrongfully filing suit against debtor after discharge; ordered
to pay debtor $156 for expenses incurred in both creditor's suit and contempt proceeding in
addition to a $50 coercive fine to be paid to the court); Holifield v. Pacific Fin. Co. (In re
Holifield), 10 COLLIER BANKs. CAS. (MB) 696, 705 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1976) (creditor held in
contempt for wrongful garnishment of debtor's employer after discharge; ordered to pay
debtor $150 in costs and attorney's fees as well as a $100 coercive fine to the court).
82. Fidelity Mortgage, 550 F.2d at 49.
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the automatic stay as proscribed by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 11-44.8 As a result, the debtor was forced to deposit a
large sum of money with the district court and to incur significant
expenses in defending the suit." Defendants commenced the ac-
tion with knowledge of the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding and of
the existence of the stay.0" On these facts, the bankruptcy judge
found defendants in contempt for violation of the stay and certi-
fied the matter to the district court to determine proper sanc-
tions." The district court affirmed the finding of contempt and or-
dered the defendants to reimburse the debtor for costs and
attorney's fees incurred in both defending the lien claim and pros-
ecuting the contempt proceeding.8"
The court of appeals, in affirming both the contempt order and
the sanctions imposed on the defendants," reached several legal
conclusions which remain of strong precedential value. First, the
court held that the stay imposed by Rule 11-44 was "specific and
definite" enough to subject the defendants to contempt for its vio-
lation. 9 Also, the court reaffirmed the established rule requiring
actual knowledge of an order before an individual could be found
in contempt for its violation.90 The decision implied that knowl-
edge of the stay was required, as opposed to mere knowledge of the
bankruptcy proceeding, but the decision is unclear on this point
since the defendants' knowledge of both the bankruptcy proceed-
ing and the stay was obvious. 1 In addition, the court found that no
formal notice of the stay was required to form the actual knowl-
edge necessary to find defendants in contempt; informal notice
would suffice.'2
The most important, and most controversial, 3 finding made by
83. FED. R. BANuKt. P. 11-44. Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the automatic stay
was not statutory but was provided under the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, with a differ-
ent rule applicable under each of the forms of relief available to the debtor. See FED. R.
BANKR. P. 401, 601, 11-44, 13-401. All these rules have been replaced by the single automatic
stay provision implemented under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. See supra note 6.
84. Fidelity Mortgage, 550 F.2d at 49.
85. Id. at 51.
86. Id. at 50.
87. Id. The total amount imposed on the defendants was approximately $20,000. Id. at
58.
88. Id. at 58.
89. Id. at 51 (quoting In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1967)).
90. Id. (citing Rubin, 378 F.2d at 108).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 52.
93. See id. at 60-61 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
MONETARY AWARDS
the court was that defendants could be found in contempt for vio-
lation of a rule.94 Defendants argued that the court was without
authority to punish disobedience to a rule which was neither an
"order, process, or writ" issued by the bankruptcy court.9 5 To this
argument the court of appeals responded:
The position of [the defendants] is . . . almost equivalent to
saying that the courts cannot enforce the rules at all. To state the
position of [the defendants] is to refute it ...
W~e conclude that the contempt power of the courts . . . in-
cludes the authority to enforce the rules themselves via contempt
orders. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the courts of the
authority necessary to ensure that the rules are obeyed."
The decisive factor in the court's analysis was that prior to the
Rules, a debtor was required to obtain a court order to stay a cred-
itor's action.97 Since the purpose behind the stay under the Rules
was to provide the debtor quicker protection with less burden,e" a
decision requiring an order before defendants could be found in
contempt would be regressive and defeating."
The second stage in the evolution of the use of the contempt
power occurred subsequent to the passage of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act and was the result of several decisions, the most promi-
nent being In re Eisenberg.100 In Eisenberg, defendants took action
to enforce a tax lien with knowledge of the debtor's bankruptcy
proceeding. 10 1 The court noted the defendants' blatant disregard of
the automatic stay and certified the matter to the district court for
prosecution as criminal contempt. 1"1 The significance of Eisenberg
94. Id. at 52-53.
95. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 69(a), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat.
2549, 2682 (1978)). Section 69(a) specified the conduct that could be punished by contempt
under FaD. R. BANKR. P. 920. See supra note 64.
96. Fidelity Mortgage, 550 F.2d at 52-53.
97. See id. at 52 n.2. See generally 2 CoLLINR, supra note 4, 1 362.01[2], at 362-16 to -20.
98. See, e.g., David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 417 (9th Cir. 1977).
99. See Fidelity Mortgage, 550 F.2d at 52 n.2; accord Elder v. City of Thomasville (In re
Elder), 12 Bankr. 491, 494 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981); cf. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in
Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. J.L. Raz. 175, 260-61 n.421 (1978) (requiring courts to issue a
restraining order would take away advantage stay was intended to provide).
100. 7 Bankr. 683 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
101. Id. at 686. The defendants' acts were in violation of the automatic stay as pro-
scribed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), (5).
102. Eisenberg, 7 Bankr. at 684. The bankruptcy judge was unable to prosecute the de-
fendants in a criminal contempt proceeding due to limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1481
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lies in two conclusions reached by the court in its analysis of the
bankruptcy court's contempt powers.
First, the court addressed what it perceived as an inconsistency
in the contempt powers to be exercised by the bankruptcy court
during the transition period between the repeal of the prior bank-
ruptcy laws and the full implementation of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act. 03 Section 41 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 had limited
the punishment of contempt to certain specified acts,'" while the
newly created 28 U.S.C. § 1481106 and the newly applicable 18
U.S.C. § 401106 contained no such limitations.10 7 The court held
that section 41, being inconsistent with the two provisions imple-
mented under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, had to be stricken
from the transition provisions.1 0 8 Yet Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 920, also applicable to bankruptcy contempt procedures,
limited acts punishable by contempt to those specified in section
41 and further limited the fine by which those acts could be pun-
ished to $250.109 By eliminating section 41 in its entirety, the court
removed the substantive provisions to which the $250 limitation
was applicable. The practical effect of the decision was to remove
any dollar limitation on the bankruptcy court's power to punish
contempt. 110
Second, the court extended the decision of Fidelity Mortgage to
allow contempt sanctions for violations of the statutory automatic
stay. The court accepted the reasoning that the automatic stay
performed the same function as the previously required court or-
since the contemptuous act was not committed within the judge's presence. Thus, the bank-
ruptcy judge certified the facts to the district judge pursuant to FED. R. BANKR. P. 920(a)(4)
so that the defendants would be prosecuted before the district court. Id. at 691.
103. Id. at 689-91.
104. See supra note 64.
105. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
107. Eisenberg, 7 Bankr. at 690.
108. Id. at 691.
109. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 920(a).
110. Eisenberg, 7 Bankr. at 690-91. Subsequent decisions are not uniform in the accept-
ance of Eisenberg's total removal of all monetary limitations on the bankruptcy court's con-
tempt power. Accord Stacy, 21 Bankr. at 52-53; but cf. Brooks v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In
re Brooks), 12 Bankr. 283, 285 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (citing Preferred Surfacing, Inc. v.
Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co. (In re Preferred Surfacing, Inc.), 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 94,
96 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976)) (no limit on compensatory relief to the debtor, but court could
not fine the creditor more than $250 in a contempt proceeding in which payment was to go
to the court). The new bankruptcy rules apparently have adopted the Eisenberg approach,
as there are no limitations on the bankruptcy court's civil contempt power. See Bankruptcy
Rules, supra note 67, Rule 9020.
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der and that contempt was the proper punishment for its viola-
tion."' The court bolstered its position by citing a congressional
bill which would have amended 28 U.S.C. § 1481 to provide that
"[a] contempt punishable by a bankruptcy court includes any act
that is in violation of a stay under [the Bankruptcy Code].' ' 2
This decision to extend the contempt power to punish violations
of the stay has received criticism."3 The bankruptcy courts, as well
as other federal courts, are limited in acts punishable by contempt
to those statutorily specified by Congress." 4 The section currently
determinative is 18 U.S.C. § 401, which provides that the contempt
power be employed against those acts specified and "none
other. 11 5 The criticism stems from the fact that the automatic
stay is statutory, and "statute" is not included among those items
for which "disobedience or resistance to" is punishable by con-
tempt under section 401(3)."' While it is true that the automatic
stay is essentially equivalent to a judicial injunction" 7 and that to
force the bankruptcy court to issue injunctions against creditor ac-
tions would defeat the purpose behind the stay, it still remains
that the automatic stay is a creation of Congress and not the bank-
ruptcy court. Generally, courts are held rigidly to the scope of their
contempt power when that power is authorized by statute."' In
light of this narrow scope afforded the courts, it is highly unlikely
that "statute" would be included among those judicial instruments
specifically referred to in section 401(3). Thus, at least to the ex-
tent that the bankruptcy courts rely on section 401(3), it appears
they are without the authority to punish violations of the stay with
contempt proceedings."
9
111. Eisenberg, 7 Bankr. at 691.
112. Id. at 692 (citing S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 225, 126 CONG. REC. H6595, 6606
(daily ed. July 23, 1980)).
113. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 4, 1 362.11, at 73 n.5 (Supp. 1982).
114. See, e.g., Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1954).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1976). See supra text accompanying note 66.
117. See, e.g., Thacker, 24 Bankr. at 838.
118. See, e.g. Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 403 (1956); Denver-Greeley Valley
Water Users Ass'n v. McNeil, 131 F.2d 67, 69-70 (10th Cir. 1942).
119. Even if not corrected by Congress through amendment, however, this technical
omission is not necessarily fatal to the bankruptcy courts' contempt power. If the court
focused on the acts of the creditor generally rather than on a violation of the automatic stay,
it is conceivable that most acts prohibited by the stay would be punishable by contempt
under 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1976). Section 401(1) prohibits the "[m]isbehavior of any person
in [the court's] presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."
While "so near thereto" has been given a locational meaning rather than a causal one, Nye
v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48 (1941), it has been held that the exclusive grant of jurisdic-
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3. Elements of Recovery
Regardless of the propriety, a contempt proceeding is the usual
method by which the debtor is compensated for his losses. While
the contempt proceeding is equitable in nature and thus a large
amount of discretion rests with the bankruptcy court,12 there are
two elements on which the debtor consistently bears the burden of
proof. In order for the creditor to be held in contempt and com-
pensation awarded, the debtor must prove both a knowing viola-
tion of the stay and damages incurred as a result of the viola-
tion.12 The decisions are unclear as to whether the standard of
proof is one of a preponderance or one of clear and convincing evi-
dence. One decision squarely embraces the clear and convincing
standard,122 as do federal contempt decisions in general, 23 while
several others imply the use of a lesser standard. 24
All decisions are in accord that the creditor will not be held in
contempt under a strict liability approach for violation of the
stay. 2 5 While a "knowing" violation of the stay is the generally
accepted degree of culpability necessary to find the creditor in con-
tempt, the courts are not uniform in their respective definitions as
practically implemented. Some decisions have refrained from hold-
ing the creditor in contempt for actions taken with knowledge of
the bankruptcy filing when the creditor has acted in a prudent
manner under a misinterpretation of the stay's applicability. 1 2
Other decisions, however, have refused to excuse the creditor act-
ing under a mistake of law. 27 The only explanation for these dis-
tinctions is that the bankruptcy courts seem to be making value
tion to the bankruptcy courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (Supp. V 1981) makes all property
of the debtor in custodia legis, e.g., Caserta, 10 Bankr. at 60, and thus any interference with
that property may be subject to contempt. See Reed, 11 Bankr. at 273.
120. See, e.g., Mulen, 14 Bankr. at 40; Reed, 11 Bankr. at 276 ("contempt power...
allows creativity in the fashioning of remedies").
121. E.g., Thacker, 24 Bankr. at 838-39.
122. Reed, 11 Bankr. at 274 n.26.
123. E.g., Schauffier v. Local 1291, Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n, 292 F.2d 182, 189-90 (3d
Cir. 1961).
124. See, e.g., Thacker, 24 Bankr. at 838-39 (debtor "need only show" constructive
knowledge of creditor and damages "sustained as demonstrated by credible evidence").
125. E.g., Pickus v. Vitagliano (In re Pickus), 8 Bankr. 114, 118-19 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1980).
126. See, e.g, Joe DeLisi Fruit Co. v. Minnesota (In re Joe DeLisi Fruit Co.), 11 Bankr.
694, 697 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981); cf. In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc., 12 Bankr. 1012,
1023 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (contempt will not be found for prudent violations "based
upon reasonable construction of applicable law").
127. Bailey v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 20 Bankr. 906, 913 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982); accord
In re Sandmar Corp., 12 Bankr. 910, 916-17 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
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judgments as to the creditors' respective sincerities and then exer-
cising their discretion accordingly."' 8
Most bankruptcy courts are in accord with other federal courts
in requiring that the creditor have actual knowledge before a con-
tempt occurs, 129 but the courts are split on whether the knowledge
required be of the bankruptcy proceeding or of the applicability of
the automatic stay.130 There are, however, several decisions in
which creditors were held in contempt based on various degrees of
constructive knowledge." 1 Once actual or constructive knowledge
is established, proof of a greater degree of culpability is generally
not required. 13 2 Nevertheless, several decisions have required the
greater culpability of willfulness before the creditor would be held
in contempt. 33 This approach conflicts with that of other courts,
where culpability beyond actual knowledge is not a required ele-
ment of a civil contempt but instead is relevant in determining a
criminal contempt.134
Where a creditor acts without knowledge in violation of the stay,
the same act may subsequently become contemptuous at the point
at which the creditor learns of the bankruptcy proceeding. At the
moment the creditor becomes aware, some courts have held that a
duty arises for the creditor to correct the violation and return the
128. Compare Frankford Trust Co. v. Allanoff (In re Dublin Properties), 20 Bankr. 616,
620 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (court found it inconceivable that creditors familiar with Bank-
ruptcy Code could believe, in good faith, that stay didn't apply) with Kenney's Franchise
Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank (In re Kenney's Franchise Corp.), 12 Bankr. 390, 395 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 22 Bankr. 747 (W.D. Va. 1982) (bank which froze
debtor's account upon knowledge of bankruptcy would not be punished for violation of stay
since bank had acted in "good faith").
129. E.g., Abt v. Household Fin. Co. (In re Abt), 2 Bankr. 323, 325 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1980).
130. See, e.g., Abt, 2 Bankr. at 325 (knowledge of stay); but see, e.g., Wariner v. First
State Bank of Livingston (In re Wariner), 16 Bankr. 216, 218 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981)
(knowledge of bankruptcy filing).
131. See Brooks, 12 Bankr. at 284 (creditor "had sufficient knowledge that a bankruptcy
was imminent to put it on notice with a duty to inquire"); accord Edwards v. Pullman
Trailmobile (In re Edwards), 5 Bankr. 663, 665 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1980); cf. Thacker, 24
Bankr. at 838 ("sufficient facts to give a reasonable man constructive knowledge that the
stay was in effect"). For an analysis of the benefits and disadvantages associated with re-
quiring actual or constructive knowledge of the automatic stay, see Reed, 11 Bankr. at 268-
76.
132. E.g., Sandmar Corp., 12 Bankr. at 917.
133. E.g., In re MacDonald, 6 Bankr. 23, 24 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (no contempt since
violation was not made with malice nor was it willful and wanton, although bank was still
ordered to compensate debtor for his losses).
134. E.g., In re Farquhar, 492 F.2d 561, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (criminal contempt requires
wrongful state of mind); NLRB v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 433 F.2d 1058, 1062
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1970) (civil contempt not dependent on state of mind).
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debtor to the status quo.' Failure of the creditor to realize this
duty and take affirmative restitutionary action is treated as con-
tempt.- 6 This approach is not followed in other courts, where fail-
ure to act does not result in contempt unless the party received an
order to act. 37
The debtor's source of recovery is not limited to contempt pro-
ceedings against the creditor whose claim gave rise to violation of
the stay. Persons who aided the creditor in violating the stay may
also be held in contempt if the aid was given with knowledge of the
debtor's bankruptcy.13 8 These contempts are imposed most often
on the attorneys of the violating creditors and attorneys have been
held jointly liable with creditors for amounts awarded to the
debtor.13 9 Furthermore, attorneys have been held solely liable for
the debtor's damages where they have acted in violation of the stay
on behalf of a creditor without the creditor's knowledge.'
Once the debtor has proved knowledge to the court's satisfac-
tion, the creditor is subject to contempt and the debtor is entitled
to compensation. Generally, the debtor is limited in his recovery to
actual losses as proved by credible evidence."' In addition to re-
covery of property obtained by the creditor in violation of the
stay,' 2 compensation awarded has included lost wages,4 commis-
sions, 1 '4 lost interest'41 and necessary car rental payments.'4 6
Where a creditor's action resulted in the debtor's loss of employ-
ment, courts have estimated the value of lost employment and
135. E.g., Johnson, 18 Bankr. at 757; but see Abt, 2 Bankr. at 325 & n.6 (automatic stay
does not impose a duty on creditor to take any affirmative action).
136. E.g., Johnson, 18 Bankr. at 757.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Joyce, 498 F.2d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 1974). While the bank-
ruptcy courts have essentially equated the automatic stay to a court order for contempt
purposes, those decisions holding the creditor in contempt for failure to take affirmative
action have exceeded the scope of this parallelism since the automatic stay does not man-
date any affirmative action on the part of the creditor. See Abt, 2 Bankr. at 325.
138. See, e.g., Wilson, 19 Bankr. at 45 (sheriff held in contempt); Bailey, 20 Bankr. at
906 (attorney held in contempt).
139. E.g., Fidelity Mortgage, 550 F.2d at 59.
140. E.g., Bailey, 20 Bankr. at 914 (inequitable to punish creditor for attorney's actions
where creditor was without knowledge of debtor's bankruptcy).
141. E.g., Thacker, 24 Bankr. at 839.
142. E.g., Holland, 21 Bankr. at 689 (return of deductions wrongfully retained by credit
union in violation of the stay); Miller, 10 Bankr. at 780 (wrongfully repossessed automobile
returned to debtor).
143. E.g., Johnson, 18 Bankr. at 757.
144. Miller, 10 Bankr. at 780.
145. Holland, 21 Bankr. at 689.
146. Wariner, 16 Bankr. at 218.
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benefits and awarded the amount to the debtor.14 7 In a decision
involving a wrongful eviction, debtors recovered increased housing
costs, increased food costs and the value of property stolen as a
result of the landlord's action. 4
8
This limitation on recovery, when strictly adhered to, results in
the debtor receiving compensation only for provable out-of-pocket
losses as opposed to recovery for intangible losses such as mental
suffering or emotional distress.'4 9 Several courts have recognized
the inadequacy of limiting compensation in this fashion and have
expanded awards to include amounts as compensation for intangi-
ble losses as well. 50 This approach, however, has not resulted in
the excessive awards that might have been predicted, since in
those decisions in which intangible losses were compensated the
creditor's conduct was especially egregious. 51
The recovery of a punitive award pursuant to a civil contempt
proceeding is of questionable validity. In theory, sanctions imposed
for civil contempt are for the benefit of the aggrieved party, either
to compensate that party for losses or to coerce the contemnor into
compliance, and are not intended as punishment for the contem-
nor.1' Imposition of a punitive sanction would remove the pro-
ceeding from one of civil contempt to one of criminal contempt
and thus would create problems regarding both the bankruptcy
court's limited powers to impose criminal contempt'53 and the pay-
ment of a punitive award to the debtor.'" This conflict has led
147. In re Batla, 12 Bankr. 397, 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
148. Lowry v. McNeil Corp. (In re Lowry), 25 Bankr. 52, 57 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982).
149. See, e.g., Demp, 23 Bankr. at 240.
150. E.g., Reed, 11 Bankr. at 277. Creditors had taken food and garbage from a restau-
rant operated by the debtors and transported it to the debtors' home, where the creditors
spread it over the debtors' porch and yard. While the court considered actual damages, it
was "more impressed with the less tangible injuries and loss occasioned by trespass on the
physical and emotional integrity of the debtors and their home." Id.
151. E.g., Lugo v. De Jesus (In re De Jesus Saez), 20 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1982)
(debtor awarded $2500 for mental anguish caused by creditor's eighteen separate acts in
violation of the stay, which eventually resulted in foreclosure and debtor's ouster from her
home); In re Shropshire, 25 Bankr. 128, 131 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982) (debtor awarded
$2500 for damages to dignity from creditor's actions resulting in debtor's arrest); In re Gib-
son, 16 Bankr. 682, 684-85 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (debtor awarded $100 for harassment
and inconvenience caused by creditor's four attempts at repossession and repeated threaten-
ing phone calls).
152. E.g., NLRB v. San Francisco Typographical Union No. 21, 465 F.2d 53, 57 (9th Cir.
1972); Preferred Surfacing, Inc., 3 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) at 96.
153. Reed, 11 Bankr. at 277.
154. Fines imposed for criminal contempt are usually paid to the court and not to the
aggrieved party. E.g., Parker, 153 F.2d at 70.
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most bankruptcy courts to refrain from awarding punitive damages
regardless of their suitability to a particular creditor's conduct.15
Nevertheless, two decisions have awarded punitive damages pursu-
ant to a civil contempt proceeding" 6' and a third impliedly would
have awarded punitive damages had the facts of the case war-
ranted their imposition.1 5 7
In addition to providing compensation to the debtor, the bank-
ruptcy courts are very liberal in awarding costs and attorney's fees.
The recovery of costs and fees is not contingent upon the creditor
being found in contempt.158 In cases in which the debtor is unable
to prove actual damages, the recovery of costs and fees may be the
only relief possible." The authority for the court's award of costs
is found in Rule 754,160 but there is no express authority for an
award of attorney's fees in either the Bankruptcy Rules or the
Bankruptcy Reform Act.161 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court "as
a federal court sitting in equity has the power to award such fees
in exceptional cases where justice so demands." 1'6 The amount
awarded is that of actual attorney's fees to the extent they are rea-
sonable, as determined by the court. "
B. Compensatory Awards Outside of Civil Contempt
Although certainly the most utilized, contempt is not the only
155. E.g., Reed, 11 Bankr. at 277.
156. Asters v. Webber Chevrolet Co. (In're Asters), 11 Bankr. 483, 485 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1981) ($1000 punitive damages for willful violation of the stay); Public Fin. Corp. v. Walker
(In re Walker), 7 Bankr. 216, 222 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1980) ($2000 punitive damages for lengthy
retention of funds garnished in violation of the stay). These decisions appear to be in error.
In both, the court cited as authority for the awards decisions which involved various claims
under established causes of action. The cited authorities did not award punitive damages
pursuant to civil contempt proceedings.
157. Augustino Enters. Inc. v. Amgro, Inc. (In re Augustino Enters., Inc.), 13 Bankr. 210,
212 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (citing Walker, 7 Bankr. at 222).
158. E.g., Caw v. Seward (In re Caw), 16 Bankr. 631, 633-34 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981)
(citing Brooks, 12 Bankr. at 285); Womack v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Womack), 4
Bankr. 632, 634 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
159. E.g., Demp, 23 Bankr. at 240.
160. FiD. R. BANKR. P. 754. Rule 754(b) provides that "[oin one day's notice costs may
be taxed and judgment therefor rendered by the court." Accord Bankruptcy Rules, supra
note 67, Rule 7054; but cf. Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank (In re Cusanno), 17 Bankr. 879, 882
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (costs and attorney's fees awarded under bankruptcy court's power
as provided under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)).
161. Brooks, 12 Bankr. at 285.
162. Id.
163. Compare Bailey, 20 Bankr. at 913-14 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982) (actual fees estab-
lished by debtor's testimony) with Mealey v. Department of Treasury (In re Mealey), 16
Bankr. 800, 802 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (amount awarded was "a fair and reasonable fee").
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theory by which bankruptcy courts have considered compensating
the debtor for a creditor's violation of the automatic stay. Several
courts have awarded compensation to the debtor without citing
any authority for such an award.'" Conceivably, these decisions
could cite to 11 U.S.C. § 105 as authority, a section which has been
the basis for several awards of costs and fees. 165 However, general
remedies logic suggests that a compensatory award should not be
sustained under the section as a judgment "necessary or appropri-
ate to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]." ' " Re-
gardless of the form of the debtor's claim or the theory under
which the court proceeds, a claim for compensatory relief is
equivalent to a claim for damages. Traditionally, a claim for dam-
ages is legal as opposed to equitable in nature.167 Damages are not
recoverable absent a legally recognized common law or statutory
right,18" neither of which apply to a violation of the automatic stay.
While an equitable claim may be redressed with a monetary award,
the award is measured by the amount necessary to achieve restitu-
tion, not compensation. 1" Therefore, the bankruptcy courts are
theoretically limited to a contempt proceeding as the method of
compensating the debtor for his losses unless the courts recognize
an implied legal cause of action for violation of the stay.
The recognition of an implied cause of action as provided under
the Bankruptcy Reform Act has generally received little support
from the bankruptcy courts1 70 and has been denied outright in the
decisions In re Stacy1 7 1 and In re Thacker.17 2 Both decisions ap-
plied the four-part test established by the Supreme Court for de-
termining implied causes of action arising under statutory
schemes. 17 Although the two decisions were not in complete agree-
164. Meek Lumber Yard, Inc. v. Houts (in re Houts), 23 Bankr. 705, 707 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1982) ($50 damages and $100 attorney's fees for fling suit to enforce mechanic's lien in
violation of the stay); In re MacDonald, 6 Bankr. 23, 24 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) ($50 dam-
ages and $225 attorney's fees for repossession of automobile in violation of the stay).
165. Elder, 12 Bankr. at 496; Cusanno, 17 Bankr. at 882.
166. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (Supp. V 1981). See supra text accompanying note 31.
167. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974).
168. See, e.g., Hodge v. Service Mach. Co., 438 F.2d 347, 349 (6th Cir. 1971).
169. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 41, § 2.1, at 25-27.
170. E.g., Transitowne Leasing, Inc. v. Gorin (In re Gorin), 18 Bankr. 151, 152-53
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1982); Reed, 11 Bankr. at 270 n.20.
171. 21 Bankr. 49 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1982).
172. 24 Bankr. 835 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
173. Both Stacy and Thacker cited the decision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),
which established the following test:
First, is the [debtor] "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted" . . . - that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
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ment as to the reason why an implied cause of action was denied,
the end result was the same. 174 Both decisions coupled the denial
of an implied cause of action with an emphasis on compensatory
contempt as the debtor's remedy.17 5 Such an emphasis is a clear
indication that compensatory contempt is the preferred, if not the
only, avenue of redress currently available to the debtor who has
sustained losses due to a creditor's actions in violation of the auto-
matic stay.
IV. SOME OBSERVATIONS
As long as Congress and the courts continue to reject a debtor's
cause of action for a violation of the automatic stay, the relief
available to the debtor is limited to that which is traditionally eq-
uitable in nature. This approach allows the bankruptcy courts con-
siderable discretion in the initial decision of whether relief should
be granted to the debtor in a particular case.170 However, once the
decision is made, the courts are confronted with inherent theoreti-
cal limitations on the monetary awards available to redress the
debtor's losses. These limitations on amount and availability make
an equitable approach toward violations of the stay less than the
optimum debtor's remedy.
The most obvious inadequacy occurs in those cases in which the
[debtor]? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one?. . . Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
[debtor]? ... And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inap-
propriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted) (quoting Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39
(1916)) (emphasis supplied by Cort court).
174. In Stacy, the court determined that the purpose behind the Bankruptcy Reform
Act indicated that Congress intended that the bankruptcy courts exercise exclusive control
over enforcement of the stay. The court focused on the debtor as an improper party to
enforce the stay through a private cause of action, rather than as a party seeking relief from
its violation. Stacy, 21 Bankr. at 52. This is inconsistent with the court's later discussion of
the debtor properly availing himself of a contempt proceeding in seeking compensation. Id.
at 52-53. Whether through a contempt proceeding or under a private cause of action, the
debtor is seeking compensation for his losses and not enforcement of a stay already violated.
In Thacker, the court noted the lack of any indication that Congress had intended a private
cause of action and expressed doubt that such an omission was inadvertent in light of the
degree of scrutiny Congress had exercised over the bankruptcy laws in general. The court
took a very strict approach to the test, emphasizing only the lack of legislative intent to
create a private cause of action as opposed to emphasizing a lack of legislative intent to
deny a private cause of action. Thacker, 24 Bankr. at 838.
175. Stacy, 21 Bankr. at 52-53; Thacker, 24 Bankr. at 838-39.
176. E.g., Mullen, 14 Bankr. at 40.
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creditor violates the stay without knowledge. It is uniformly ac-
cepted that the creditor have some degree of knowledge prior to
being subject to contempt.17 7 Outside of contempt proceedings,
monetary awards in equity are restitutionary. In these cases, the
debtor's recovery is limited to the amount gained by the creditor
through violation of the stay.19 The problem with this approach is
that the debtor's losses generally exceed the creditor's gains and
have no relation to the creditor acting with or without knowledge.
The property gained by the creditor and recoverable by the debtor,
for example the amount garnished or an automobile repossessed, is
always the minimum amount of loss sustained by the debtor.
When the two amounts are equal, the restitutionary award is ade-
quate relief. 1 7  If the debtor sustains additional losses, whether
they be concrete amounts such as lost wages or intangible damages
such as mental suffering, the restitutionary award is inadequate.
This approach is an anomaly to the general purpose of the bank-
ruptcy laws as a debtor's remedy since, in those instances where
neither party is at fault, it produces a result unfavorable to the
debtor.
At the point where the creditor's act becomes contemptuous, the
debtor's ability to recover his losses is greatly enhanced. Neverthe-
less, in addition to the questionable use of contempt to deal with
violations of a statute 8 0 there are inherent problems in the use of
contempt to compensate the debtor. It has been suggested that a
goal of compensatory contempt is to promote the underlying sub-
stantive rights which were violated by the contemptuous act.'' If
so, the prodebtor policies expressed by the automatic stay and the
bankruptcy laws in general should be reflected in the contempt
proceedings. To achieve this goal, the bankruptcy court should, at
the minimum, adopt a preponderance of the evidence standard." 2
This standard should be carried over to proof of loss as well, and
compensation should be awarded for all losses proved by the
177. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
179. It is questionable whether the debtor's loss will ever equal the creditor's gain, since
in every case the debtor has lost the intangible benefit of the protection of the automatic
stay. Cf. Rendleman, supra note 54, at 974 (when fashioning monetary awards pursuant to a
contempt proceeding for violation of an injunction, courts should take into consideration the
initial decision to enjoin).
180. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
181. See Rendleman, supra note 54, at 973.
182. Cf. id. at 980-81 (advocating a preponderance standard in compensatory contempt
proceedings for violation of an injunction).
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debtor.' s8
Another problem with the use of compensatory contempt as the
debtor's remedy is the prohibition of punitive damage awards.
Some form of deterrence beyond a compensatory award is neces-
sary to ensure creditor compliance with the prohibitions of the au-
tomatic stay. In the cases in which the creditor's gains exceed the
debtor's losses, a compensatory award is not a deterrent.1" For ex-
ample, a compensatory award would not deter a creditor from re-
possessing a piece of heavy machinery from an inactive debtor
where the creditor has an opportunity to profit from another use of
the machinery, since the debtor would sustain no actual losses.
While the possibility of criminal contempt sanctions may serve as
a deterrent in cases such as this, a punitive damage award appears
to be a better approach. In theory, criminal contempts are
designed to punish the contemnor as well as "to vindicate the pub-
lic interest in obedience to court orders."'185 In the case of violation
of the stay, however, the interest in compliance is much more the
debtor's than the public's, since the violation has no real effect
outside the debtor-creditor relationship. Punitive damage awards
accomplish the same objective as criminal contempt fines in terms
of punishment and incentive for compliance, without the need to
resort to criminal procedure. Furthermore, punitive damages
would serve a compensatory function by providing relief for the
intangible damage sustained by the debtor for loss of the benefit of
the stay.' 6
On the surface, it appears that these problems could be allevi-
ated if Congress would amend the Bankruptcy Reform Act to pro-
vide the debtor a cause of action for violation of the automatic
stay. A statutory cause of action could be tailored to provide the
debtor a minimum of full compensation and, if the creditor's con-
duct so warranted, additional amounts could be awarded to the
debtor as well.18 7 The creation of such a remedy would provide the
debtor with all the benefits of a civil action, including a preponder-
183. See Reed, 11 Bankr. at 276 (citing McComb, 336 U.S. at 193) (court should always
award the amount necessary to achieve full remedial relief).
184. See Rendleman, supra note 54, at 993.
185. Id. at 972.
186. Cf. id. at 993-94 (punitive damages fill the gap created in those cases in which the
plaintiff was deprived of the benefits of an injunction).
187. Statutory schemes often provide for awards in addition to damages awarded for the
plaintiff's actual losses. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e) (1976) (creditors who unlawfully discrimi-
nate against credit applicants will be liable for actual damages and, if the creditor's conduct
so merits, punitive damages as well).
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ance of the evidence standard. The increased benefits enjoyed by
the debtor, however, would be accompanied by increased burdens
on the overall bankruptcy system. The creation of a damages ac-
tion would necessarily include the right to a jury trial. 88 Jury trials
have been denied in prior bankruptcy proceedings for the reasons
that bankruptcy is an inherently equitable proceeding and that a
jury trial would hinder the otherwise prompt resolution of bank-
ruptcy disputes.18 9 In addition, a statutory cause of action would
remove to some degree the amount of discretion currently exer-
cised by the bankruptcy court in addressing violations of the auto-
matic stay. Therefore, Congress is faced with the decision as to
whether to increase the debtor's ability to recover at the expense of
the cohesiveness of the overall bankruptcy system, or to preserve
the current system while providing the debtor less than the opti-
mum remedy for violations of the automatic stay. While Congress
has not yet conclusively addressed the question, all indications
tend to show that Congress will favor preserving the cohesiveness
of the overall equitable system over providing an amendment in-
creasing the debtor's ability to recover by creating a statutory
cause of action for violation of the stay.90
V. CONCLUSION
In addressing violations of the automatic stay, bankruptcy courts
utilize an equitable approach to providing monetary awards to the
aggrieved debtor. The specific theory utilized and the amount re-
coverable by the debtor depend upon whether or not the creditor
knowingly violated the stay.19" If the creditor violated the stay
without knowledge, the bankruptcy courts provide the debtor with
a restitutionary award, payable by the creditor, which is measured
by the amount the creditor gained by acting in contravention of
the stay. If the creditor knowingly violated the stay, the creditor is
held in civil contempt and the debtor is awarded an amount com-
pensating him for his losses. There is some dispute as to the pro-
priety of the bankruptcy courts holding a creditor in contempt for
violation of a statute. Nevertheless, compensatory civil contempt is
188. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194.
189. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966).
190. See S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 225, 126 CONG. Rac. H6595, 6606 (daily ed. July
28, 1980), H. RaP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 123 (automatic stay not intended to affect
creditor's substantive rights in any way).
191. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
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the primary, and probably the only, 92 method currently available
for redressing the debtor's losses sustained as the result of a credi-
tor's violation of the automatic stay.
An equitable approach is not the optimum approach toward pro-
viding debtor relief. The debtor's recovery is dependent upon the
creditor knowingly violating the stay, but the debtor's losses in-
curred as a result of the creditor's violation bear no similar rela-
tion. In addition, a compensatory civil contempt proceeding is pro-
cedurally more burdensome to the debtor than a civil suit, and
there is a prohibition on the imposition of punitive damages. These
problems associated with an equitable approach could be remedied
if Congress would create a statutory cause of action for a violation
of the automatic stay. While such congressional action would
surely benefit the debtor, it would also burden the existing bank-
ruptcy laws by creating a legal cause of action in an otherwise eq-
uitable system. All indications tend to show that Congress is un-
willing to take such a step, and thus, for the time being, the debtor
appears to be limited to recovering equitable relief.
192. See supra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
